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Proceedings of the Annual Acquisition Research Program 
The following article is taken as an excerpt from the proceedings of the 
annual Acquisition Research Program.  This annual event showcases the research 
projects funded through the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School 
of Business and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Featuring keynote 
speakers, plenary panels, multiple panel sessions, a student research poster show 
and social events, the Annual Acquisition Research Symposium offers a candid 
environment where high-ranking Department of Defense (DoD) officials, industry 
officials, accomplished faculty and military students are encouraged to collaborate 
on finding applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and 
processes within the DoD today.  By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of 
industry and academia, the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and 
collaborations which can identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, 
contract, financial, logistics and program management. 
For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, 
electronic copies of additional research, or to learn more about becoming a sponsor, 
please visit our program website at: 
www.acquistionresearch.org  
For further information on or to register for the next Acquisition Research 
Symposium during the third week of May, please visit our conference website at: 
www.researchsymposium.org  
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Business management reform efforts have been part of the US Defense Department 
agenda for decades. Current reform efforts have explicitly established the goal of generating, 
harvesting, and reinvesting savings from business management reform to buy more capital 
items; that is, they have focused on a measurable reallocation from operating and support costs 
to investment within a given budget top-line.  While this would seem to be good news for the 
acquisition community, recent increases in the defense top-line, largely related to the war on 
terrorism, have not necessarily resulted in greater allocations for acquisition. An examination of 
the factors affecting the top-line suggests that near-term budget uncertainty is likely. An 
examination of current and past defense management reforms suggests that efficiency-seeking 
business management reforms are not likely to generate sufficient resources to cover a budget 
decline or finance significant capital reinvestment.  Instead, management reform, including on-
going reform of acquisition management, should be sustained for reasons of stewardship and 
accountability. 
Keywords: Defense management, defense budgets, management reform  
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Introduction 
After six years of increasing budgets and an active defense management reform agenda 
in the G.W. Bush Administration, it now appears that defense budgets may be headed for a 
more uncertain near-term future, and the future role of management reform initiatives may be 
equally uncertain.  Despite significant increases in defense spending, resource allocation 
decisions are favoring operating expenses over capital investments.  External pressures from 
the budget deficit, rising costs for entitlement programs, pressure from other discretionary 
programs in the federal budget and public opinion regarding defense activities suggest that total 
resources allocated for defense will be constrained in the foreseeable future.  Internal pressures 
from rising costs for manpower, health care, operations and maintenance are constraining 
discretionary spending inside the defense budget—even as acquisition costs are also 
increasing. The Department of Defense (DoD) and the individual service components have 
been looking toward major management reform initiatives as a means to save and reinvest 
resources within current budget projections. What are the implications of this budgetary and 
management environment for acquisition? 
Why the Near-term DoD Budget May Be Uncertain 
When one asks whether the DoD budget top-line will rise or fall, there are both historical 
patterns which should be considered as well as internal and external factors that affect those 
patterns.  
Figure 1 displays three measures of the defense top-line over the period 1940-2011.  In 
absolute terms, since WWII, defense outlays appear as a cyclical pattern with a lower limit of 
about $350 billion and an upper limit of about $550 billion in FY2006 dollars. The cycles are 
fairly consistent with a wavelength ranging from 15 to 21 years. Fiscal Year 2007 is 18 years 
since the last peak in 1989, suggesting that if the long-term pattern repeats, defense will face 
declining absolute top-lines beginning within the next few years and continuing for 7-10 years. 
  










































































Figure 1. Defense Top-line 1940-2011: Various Measures  
(OMB, 2007) 
In relative terms, since WWII, defense spending as a percentage of GDP has fallen 
rather steadily from a peak of 14.2 percent in 1952 to a low of 3 percent in 1999-2000. In 2006, 
defense spending stood at about 4.1 percent of GDP. Similarly, defense spending as a 
percentage of federal outlays has also fallen significantly, from a peak of 69.5 percent in 1954 to 
a low of 16.1 percent in 1999. In 2006, defense was 19.8 percent of federal outlays. Today, 
approximately 1/5 of federal government spending is for national defense, and 4/5 are for other 
functions of government; in the 1950s, 2/3 of government spending was defense. Should the 
long-term trends continue, defense can expect declining relative top-lines. 
Simply identifying the trend of the last 50 years does not mean that trend will apply to the 
next 3-5 years. We do not have the knowledge to make a point prediction. More than a long-
term trend is needed, and there are other factors that may affect the top-line—those both 
external and internal to the department. Apart from the obvious effects of the war, certain 
external factors are associated with federal fiscal policy and political dynamics.   
External Fiscal Factors 
Deficits. As of 2006, the US has experienced four consecutive years of budget deficits 
following four consecutive years of budget surpluses. The Bush Administration’s position is that 
it will eliminate such annual deficits by 2012. When an administration or congress wishes to 
reduce a deficit, generally it requires a combination of increasing revenues and decreasing 
outlays. If defense maintains even a steady proportion of federal spending during an overall 
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decline, it will lose top-line.1  But the correlation between defense spending and deficits may be 
even more closely connected.  
Defense Spending vs Budget Deficit (Surplus), 1979-2006
in constant 2006 dollars
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Figure 2. Defense Spending and Deficits, 1979-2006  
(OMB, 2007) 
Figure 2 plots budget deficits against defense spending from 1979 to 2006. It is readily 
apparent that as defense spending rose, deficits increased; as spending on defense fell, deficits 
fell to the point of achieving surpluses. Defense spending does not necessarily cause deficits; 
rather, each could be affected by a third factor such as an unstable international situation. 
However, the apparent relationship suggests near-term uncertainty for the defense budget as 
deficit-reduction policies take hold. 
Mandatory Programs. Defense spending has fallen from 2/5 of federal spending to 1/5 
in the past 40 years, supplanted by mandatory spending; see Figure 4. From 1966 to 2006, 
interest on the debt and “all other spending” accounted for roughly the same proportion of 
federal spending—about 41 percent. The remaining 59 percent was largely defense spending in 
1966; at that time, defense spending was three times more than Social Security spending. In the 
intervening 40 years, the proportion of federal spending on defense was reduced more than 50 
percent while Social Security rose by 40 percent. Health programs, new in 1966, represent 
nearly as much as defense in 2006.2   
                                                
1 Of course, if growth is kept below the rate of inflation, there could be deficit reduction with a nominal 
increase in the top-line. 
2 If one allocates the health-care related programs from defense and “all other spending” and adds them 
to the Medicare & Medicaid wedge, the total health care portion grows to about 25 percent while defense 
falls to about 19 percent. See table 16.1 of the Historical Tables that accompany the federal budget for 
Fiscal Year 2008. 
  




Figure 3. Components of Federal Spending  
(OMB, 2007) 
The Congressional Budget Office estimates that this shift will continue. It estimates that 
in 2016, the mandatory programs will cost $1,274 billion more than in 2006—rising to a total of 
$2,793 billion (CBO, 2006). That is more than all the projected federal outlays, mandatory and 
discretionary spending in 2007. The CBO projects that in the period from 2008-2017, 
discretionary budget authority will increase at 2.0 percent per annum, relative to GDP growth of 
4.5 percent, while mandatory spending will grow at 5.9 percent (CBO, 2007).   
Non-defense Discretionary Spending. Defense top-lines not only feel pressure from 
growing entitlement programs, but may also face pressure from other discretionary programs. 
From 1985 to 2006, total discretionary outlays as a percentage of GDP fell from 10.0 percent to 
7.8 percent. Of those 2.2 percentage points, defense spending accounted for 2.1 and other 
discretionary spending accounted for 0.1 (CBO, 2007).  Nearly the entire reduction in 
discretionary spending was absorbed by defense. The last few years of that history tell a 
different story, however.  From 2001 to 2006, total discretionary outlays as a percentage of GDP 
rose from 6.3 percent to 7.8 percent. Of that 1.5 percentage point increase, defense accounted 
for 1.0 point and non-defense accounted for 0.5 (CBO, 2007).  Figure 4 displays a 40-year trend 
in discretionary spending separating defense from non-defense spending. We see again the 
cyclical nature of defense spending with a counter-cyclical, but steadily upward trend in non-
defense spending.  
  




Figure 4. Defense & Non-defense Spending by Administration  
(OMB, 2007) 
External Political Factors 
How responsive are Washington decision-makers to the demands of the public? The 
evidence strongly suggests that if the general public believes defense spending is too high, 
defense spending declines and vice-versa. Studies conducted at the end of the Cold War 
demonstrated empirically that the desires of the public are reflected in future spending decisions 
(Hartley & Russett, 1992; Higgs & Kilduff, 1993).  
Updating that research, Figure 5 displays the direction and strength of public opinion 
about defense spending with subsequent changes in that spending. Change in defense 
spending correlates strongly with the direction and strength of public opinion. When public 
opinion favors increased defense spending, spending has tended to go up the following year; 
when the public favors a decrease, spending tends to drop the following year. The intensity of 
public opinion also forecasts the significance of the gain or drop. In combination with the data in 
Figure 1, one might conclude that the public has a “comfort zone” of appropriate defense 
spending that ranges between $350 billion and $550 billion (FY2006 dollars). Yet, defense 
spending for FY08 is projected to be $593 billion (FY2006 dollars). 
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Democratization of Defense Spending, 1973-2006
Direction and strength of public opinion vs change in defense outlays one year later
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Figure 5. Public Opinion and Defense Spending  
(Authors, derived from Smith, 2007; OMB, 2007) 
What does the public currently believe about defense spending? The polling data used 
in Figure 5 indicates that in 2006, 39.4 percent of Americans favored reduced defense 
spending, contrasted with 26.8 percent who favored an increase (Smith, 2007). The Program on 
International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland researches American 
attitudes regarding international and foreign policy issues. An extensive survey in 2005 asked a 
representative sample of Americans to reallocate a hypothetical $1000 in income taxes across 
federal programs in the proportion they believed was most appropriate. Before the reallocation, 
they were shown the actual 2006 budget.  These survey respondents would have cut the DoD 
baseline budget by 31 percent and war supplemental appropriations by 35 percent. They would 
have reallocated most of those resources toward reducing the deficit and improving education.  
They favored increases in international affairs programs and would have reallocated defense 
spending away from strategic and heavy capacity (e.g, nuclear weapons, bomber aircraft and 
capital ships) toward manpower, communication, intelligence and special operations capabilities 
(PIPA, 2005).   
To summarize, there has been fiscal pressure on the defense top-line from growth in 
mandatory spending accounts and non-defense discretionary accounts. We are again at a time 
when deficits are a point of concern. Politically, the current Administration faces increased 
congressional opposition to military policies; public support of defense spending is waning.  
Time will tell how that manifests in spending decisions. External factors are vital when 
considering current defense management reform, but internal factors may be more important.  
  




Internal factors affecting defense spending are those defense leaders are more able to 
directly control. They include budgeting and spending for acquisition, personnel, and operation 
and maintenance. The policy of budgeting for the war separately also confounds analysis of 
defense spending. Before looking at specific factors, let us take a broad view.  From the low 
point of the 1990s “procurement holiday” to today, the DoN’s budget has increased 46 percent 
in real terms, but the size of the fleet fell from 354 battleforce ships to 280; aircraft inventory fell 
from 2,559 to 2,330; and the number of personnel (uniformed and civilian) fell from 929,358 to 
829,531 (Navy, 2007b). While spending increased by half, the naval forces are 15 percent 
smaller.  The last time defense experienced twelve continuous years of budget growth was 
1979-1990 during which time the fleet grew from 530 to 587 ships. 
To sustain the current goal of a 313-ship Navy, there needs to be sufficient shipbuilding 
budget authority to consistently build an average of eleven ships a year. Since 1998, Navy 5-
year budgets have planned to build eight ships per year but have succeeded in building only six 
ships per year. To get to twelve will require nearly doubling the annual shipbuilding budget, 
currently at $11 billion (CRS, 2006b). Can management reform efforts generate $10 billion from 
the other accounts? 
Acquisition Costs 
The Department’s appetite for major acquisition programs and the cost performance of 
those programs continue to be important issues. The Joint Strike Fighter, F-22A, the Army 
Future Combat System, the Air Force’s Transformational Satellite System, the Navy’s DD-1000 
and Virginia-class submarine programs have all experienced significant cost growth, quantity 
reductions or schedule slips (CRS, 2005). In early 2007, the Navy acquisition executive issued a 
stop-work order for the relatively affordable Littoral Combat ship when the first ship in the class 
experienced costs 50 percent over budget.  Thus, one comes to the difficult realization that just 
as other internal and external factors are putting pressure on the fiscal resources available for 
recapitalization, acquisition itself is a source of fiscal stress. 
Personnel Costs 
Pay and benefits for personnel have increased in recent years. At the same time, 
accrual accounting changes have illuminated some costs (such as the accrued costs of retiree 
heath care) which have always been there, but weren’t explicitly recognized. The activation of 
tens of thousands of reservists and guardsmen for the Iraq war resulted in higher pay and 
increased long-term liabilities because their benefits packages have been expanded. Figure 7 
plots Department of the Navy spending from 1997-2008 on pay, allowances and family housing 
against the total number of active and reserve Navy and Marines. In constant dollars, the cost 
per troop has risen 47 percent. In an effort to hold outlays constant, the policy has been to 
reduce the size of the force. 
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Personnel spend per service member (constant FY06 dollars)
FY97: $44.7K                                                               FY08: $65.6 K
 
Figure 7. Rising Personnel Costs, Measures  
(Navy, 2007) 
Operations and Maintenance Costs 
Looking back, O&M spending in the Department of the Navy since 1997 (including the 
significant Marine Corps participation in GWOT) has remained a steady 32 percent of DoN 
spending, but that is at a time when the force structure has decreased 15 percent (Navy, 
2007b). Looking forward, the war’s toll on equipment will drive up O&M requirements for the 
next few years, particularly in depot maintenance (GAO, 2006).  However, that is not readily 
apparent in the budget.  The FY2008/2009 defense budget, like all defense budgets since 9/11, 
was tallied and submitted separately from the wartime supplemental budget. Because of that 
practice, the baseline budget for Marine Corps depot maintenance shows a decrease from $372 
million in 2006 to $71 million in 2008 (Navy, 2007a).  Separately, the Marine Corps requested 
an FY2008 supplemental appropriation of $490.6 million for this account. If one has the 
wherewithal to marry the two, they will see that depot maintenance is actually projected to 
increase from $372 million to $562 million, not decrease. Program and budget analysts, in an 
attempt to separate a “peacetime” budget from the cost of war, now produce twice the number 
of documents (leading to twice the legislation and twice the number of accounts to manage)—
none of which individually accurately portrays the true level of activity.  
Other supplemental appropriation issues 
The wartime supplemental appropriations confound analysis of defense spending 
further.  When the Navy submitted its FY2008 budget, it announced cuts in the acquisition of 
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aircraft (Castelli, 2007) but replaced a large number of those aircraft in the supplemental 
requests.  For example, nine H-1 helicopters were cut from the base, but requested in the 
supplemental; eight H-60 helicopters were cut from the base, but nine were requested in the 
supplemental; four V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft were cut from the base, and three were requested in 
the supplemental (despite the fact the V-22 has not been used in the war) (Navy, 2007).  
Theses practices cause distortions in baseline budgets that may negatively affect future DoD 
budgets after the use of supplemental appropriations ceases unless some type of “recapture” 
takes place. 
Summary 
Will the defense top-line rise or fall over the next few years? Long-term historical trends 
suggest that by all measures (%GDP, %Outlays, constant dollars), defense spending is likely to 
fall. If one takes into consideration factors in the near-term, we see evidence of downward 
pressure. External factors such as growing entitlement programs and growing discretionary 
programs restrict the room for growth in the defense budget, particularly during periods when 
there is political pressure to reduce deficits. In addition, the newly-elected Democratic 
leadership in Congress and the direction and strength of public opinion question increased 
defense spending.  Internal factors push for a higher top-line but include significant inflationary 
effects, so top-line increases have bought less force structure (but not necessarily less 
capability). Supplemental appropriations for the war are likely to continue and provide an 
opportunity for the defense department to seek relief from budget pressures.  The Bush 
Administration requested a significant defense budget increase in FY2008, 11 percent more 
than in FY2007; but the DoD is already exhibiting signs of fiscal stress. No one can say for 
certain what will happen in the future, but it appears the defense budget is under both increased 
stress as well as increased scrutiny. 
Defense Business Management Reform 
How does this budget situation relate to business management reform within the DoD?  
A review of the recent history of defense business management reform and an examination of 
the current management reform agenda suggest some implications for both budgeting and 
managing in a time of uncertain budgets. 
 Recent History of Defense Business Management Reform 
The George W. Bush Administration also came to office with a management focus. The 
President’s Management Agenda (PMA) addresses five areas targeted for management reform 
throughout the federal government: human capital, improved financial management, competitive 
sourcing, electronic government, and budget and performance integration (Rumsfeld, 2003). 
In the DoD, an initial management objective was to “increase effectiveness through 
increased accountability and efficiency” (Rumsfeld, 2002), with emphasis on cost reduction, 
improving quality, reducing redundancies, and adopting best business practices.  Secretary 
Rumsfeld emphasized the creation and use of metrics to quantify performance improvements, 
and he sought to focus the Department’s resources on core functions (Francis & Walther, 2006). 
To improve its efficiency, the DoD is tackling several significant challenges: cost reduction, 
organizational realignment and cultural issues (Walker, 2004).  
The DoD has identified six major, strategic, high-leverage initiatives called Business 
Enterprise Priorities (BEPs).  These BEPs include achieving better visibility into personnel, 
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acquisitions, materiel, finances, common supplier engagement and real property accountability 
(DoD, 2006a). Oversight of defense business transformation is conducted by the Defense 
Business Board, an advisory panel consisting of private-sector executives chartered to provide, 
“independent advice and recommendations on effective strategies for the implementation of 
best business practices of interest to the Department of Defense” (DoD, 2007).The 
Department’s Business Management Modernization Program (BMMP) and Defense Business 
Transformation Agency (DBTA) were created to institutionalize parts of the DoD change 
program. DBTA’s strategic objectives include improving financial stewardship, enabling rapid 
access to information, and reducing the costs of defense business operations (Pair, 2007).  
DBTA has established seven directorates to manage its reform agenda—including the Defense 
Business Systems Acquisition Executive. 
The Army, Navy and Air Force have developed service-specific management reform 
agendas, as well.  Lean Six Sigma is the Army’s tool of choice to drive across-the-board 
elimination of unnecessary or wasteful processes, the reduction of process variability, and the 
improvement of quality (Army, 2006).  The Air Force intends to create new processes through 
its Smart Ops 21 program, which encompasses the tools of Lean, Six Sigma and Theory of 
Constraints (Lopez, 2005).  The Navy’s Sea Enterprise initiative aims to reduce costs in order to 
provide internally generated resources for reinvestment and recapitalization (Clark, 2002).   Sea 
Enterprise has identified three imperatives: change the culture, improve processes and 
structures, and harvest savings.3 The Navy is also undertaking a challenging enterprise 
realignment to create a more matrixed organization and to create a culture of enterprise-wide 
thinking. 
The current management reform agendas have a defining distinction: they focus on 
generating internal savings through effective cost management to support investment and 
recapitalization for the operating forces.  This vision has been much more explicit than those of 
past reform efforts.  It provides a measurable objective, and it aligns with the core values and 
mission of the organization.  
There are practical issues associated with this objective, of course, such as how to re-
allocate operating funds to investment accounts effectively in an execution year, how to track 
and apply savings within the current accounting systems, and how to distinguish between “real” 
savings and future cost avoidance.  Even if these obstacles can be overcome, there are larger 
issues that threaten to undermine the management reform agenda and, in turn, reduce or 
eliminate recapitalization funds derived from management reform. 
Management Reform at Risk? 
The current defense management reform agenda is driven by three factors: (a) to align 
changed business practices with force transformation; (b) to generate resources internally to 
support recapitalization and investment in future combat systems; and (c) to reduce internal 
pressures on the defense budget as well as to respond to external pressures on the defense 
budget. If these imperatives are as strong as they appear, what then could undermine the 
current reform effort and make it unsustainable? There are four clear possibilities.  
                                                
3 For a more thorough description of current reform efforts, see (Dawe & Jones, 2005) and (DoD, 2006b). 
  
                  Acquisition Research: creating synergy for informed change        - 440 - 
 
 
1. War Costs. If operations in Iraq and Afghanistan persist, costs associated with the base 
defense budget and the war effort will continue to diverge—particularly if war funding 
continues to be provided through non-traditional budget “bridges” and supplemental 
appropriations, a pattern unseen in the budgeting for past wars (CRS, 2006a). In this 
case, management associated with the base budget will operate in an increasingly 
constrained environment, while unconstrained spending will continue to be associated 
with the war. This is hardly an environment that will drive culture change and cost 
management throughout the organization. Moreover, these conditions invite the 
migration of base budget functions to the less constrained and less cost-managed war 
budget—resulting in distortions in the base budget that will affect future budget 
decisions.  
2. Losing the Vision. Alternatively, Congress could demand that appropriations for the war 
efforts migrate to the base budget.  In that case, it is likely total defense resources will 
erode as they are combined and become more transparent. Thus follows the second 
possibility: losing the reform vision to current-year “budget drills” to meet unfunded 
needs or to fill budget “wedges” in the execution year. Successful reforms may depend 
on demonstrating that the cost reductions and management reforms have generated the 
desired savings and that the savings have been applied to the stated objective. Failure 
to sustain or account for the results can lead to a loss of credibility for senior leaders 
(Roberto, 2005). If budget reductions cause the recaptialization goals to disappear in 
favor of simply meeting reduced budget targets, much of the motivation for reform could 
be lost.     
3. Change Fatigue.  “Repetitive Change Syndrome” is experienced when organizations too 
frequently adopt change initiatives. Such frequency generates chaos, burnout, and 
incapacity to make further change, thus, harming daily operations (Abrahamson, 2004).  
Observers warn against adopting change initiatives too frequently (Abrahamson, 2004). 
Defense management reform has been a continuous theme for over twenty years. 
Sustaining transformation could now depend on learning more about how the 
organization perceives the change agenda through analysis of communications and 
feedback and by examining the knowledge, attitudes, and actions of the receptors of 
communications about transformation. 
4. Leadership Change. Leaders change frequently in the DoD among both uniformed and 
senior civilian leaders. It often appears that management reform initiatives do not survive 
leadership transitions, notwithstanding the success or failure of any particular reform 
initiative. The current Administration is in its final two years; sustaining its management 
agenda beyond the election horizons may not be a high priority in the permanent DoD 
bureaucracy. A new management agenda will replace the current “transformation” 
agenda, though the next administration will almost certainly face the same challenges to 
find more efficient defense business-management practices and seek reinvestable cost 
savings from these efficiencies.  Learning to institutionalize the principles and processes 
of management reform will be important to future leadership transitions. We recommend 
a research and education project to facilitate the sustainment of improvements in 
defense business management practices through the expected leadership transition of 
2008-2009. 
 Management Reform in a Declining Budget 
How then should management reform be considered, if budgets are likely to decline and 
significant organizational risk factors threaten sustainment of defense business-management 
reform initiatives? 
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Efficiency-seeking management reforms will be insufficient to make up the budget 
shortfall.  Claimed cost savings can be initially impressive.   For instance, the Naval Air Systems 
Command claims FY 2007 savings-to-date amounting to 13.9 million—composed of permanent 
cost reductions ($6.1 million) and potential cost reductions from improved practices ($7.8 
million) (Navy, 2007c).  Overall, the Navy’s business transformation advocate claims combined 
savings from Sea Enterprise initiatives of $27.7 billion from FY 2003-2005 (McCarthy, 2006). In 
both cases, some of the savings are realized in current-year operations; more are the result of 
projected cost reductions and revised future spending requirements. Nevertheless, these 
savings are not likely to close the budget gap if defense budgets decline and there is insufficient 
evidence to indicate whether any of these savings can be tracked to reinvestment in capital 
accounts. Even if efficiency-seeking savings reduce a significant portion of the internally 
generated fiscal stress, cost-reduction measures through management initiatives will not likely 
close the entire fiscal gap because they only address the internal sources of stress. The 
external sources are untouched by efficiency savings. Moreover, cost reductions are dispersed 
throughout the organization, are difficult to harvest, and are likely to be hoarded by middle 
managers in the face of tight resources. Savings in current-year budgets are likely to be 
redirected to under-funded current requirements.  
Good management does not attract resources. There is little evidence to suggest that 
good management is rewarded with larger budgets. Resource-allocation decisions are policy 
choices among competing demands. Good management reduces the demand and may lead to 
reduced marginal future resource bases. Even the movement toward performance budgeting in 
the federal government leaves unclear the link between performance and resource allocation 
(Miller, Hildreth, & Rabin, 2001).  Budgets simply do not grow because an agency gets a clean 
audit opinion or reengineers business practices. 
If efficiency-seeking business-management reform cannot be viewed as a solution to 
declining defense budgets, how should the DoD view the rationale for sustaining management 
reform initiatives?  There are three strong imperatives for sustaining an effective management 
reform agenda: 
Continuous efficiency-seeking management improvement in the DoD should be 
understood as driven by stewardship concerns and the requirements of the operating forces. 
The DoD has the responsibility to the President, the Congress and the public to be a good 
steward of the highly material portion of the federal budget it manages. There is a justified 
expectation that the DoD will manage its resources well. The DoD also has a responsibility to 
support efficiently the varied requirements of the operating forces: people, systems, weapons, 
materiel. The policies and processes of management reform must align with operational 
requirements, especially as force transformation increases pressure on the business side of the 
department. 
Large budget reductions can only be met by truly transformational responses.  Despite 
the rhetoric of “transformation,” the history of management reform in the DoD has been a model 
of incremental continuous change.  A large decline in the defense top-line can only be met by 
transformational changes that take functions AND costs out of the department permanently.  
Major productivity improvements through consolidations, divestiture of both functions as well as 
assets, cancelled programs, and sharply reduced personnel would have to be achieved. 
The acquisition community must view itself as a participant in cost-focused management 
reform rather than as a beneficiary.  Rising acquisition costs are a major source of internal fiscal 
stress for the DoD. It is unlikely that cost reductions in other internal areas (such as personnel 
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or operations and maintenance) can possibly generate savings that will match the current 
growth in capital costs, let alone provide funds for additional reinvestment.  The acquisition 
community must focus on its own cost-reduction initiatives to help generate the funding needed 
for recapitalization. 
Thus, the matter of sustaining management reform in a time of uncertain budgets can be 
approached as two questions, not one: What are the best budget-policy decisions regarding 
resource levels and allocation considering the salient internal and external factors? And how 
much and what type of management reform is needed to meet the standards of stewardship 
and to support the requirements of the operating forces? 
Conclusion 
We have both investigated business management reform in the Department of Defense 
as well as examined the question of uncertain defense budgets. It is evident that pressure on 
the defense top-line comes from both external sources and internal factors. We have argued 
that efficiency-seeking management reforms can only address the internal pressures on the 
defense top-line.  We have identified specific threats to the sustainment of defense 
management reform in a time of declining budgets and have offered strategic propositions to 
consider when addressing management reform in a time of uncertain budgets. 
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